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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes how exchange rate policy a¤ects the issuance and pricing
of international bonds for developing countries. We nd that countries with less exible
exchange rate regimes pay higher sovereign bond spreads and are less likely to issue bonds.
Quantitatively, changing a free-oating regime to a xed regime decreases the likelihood of
bond issuance by 4.6% and increases the bond spread by 1.3% on average. Furthermore,
countries with real exchange rate overvaluation have higher bond spreads and higher bond
issuance probabilities. Moreover, such positive e¤ects of real exchange rate overvaluation
tend to be magnied for countries with xed exchange rate regimes. Our results suggest
that choosing a less exible exchange rate regime in general leads to higher borrowing costs
for developing countries, especially when their currencies are overvalued.
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1 Introduction
The recent turmoil in the euro zone has disturbed European economies ranging from pe-
ripheral to core countries and raises wide spread concerns over the likelihood of sovereign
default and the fate of the euro. The relation between exchange rate arrangements and
country risk has long been considered an important policy issue. However, the relation has
yet to be studied formally in the academic literature. The goal of our paper is to empiri-
cally examine how exchange rate policy a¤ects the issuing and pricing of foreign debt for
developing countries. This study has potentially useful implications for developed countries,
such as those a¤ected by the euro zone debt crisis.
Due to the risk of default,1 developing countries pay a sizable default risk premium
on their debt. Moreover, developing countries typically have a large amount of debt de-
nominated in foreign currency. When the foreign debt is denominated in foreign currency,
a weaker local currency can exacerbate debt service di¢ culties through the balance sheet
e¤ect and a¤ect the country spread. Hence, exchange rate management plays an important
role for developing countries foreign debt nancing. At the same time, the choice of an
exchange rate regime remains an elusive part of macroeconomic policy. In this paper, we
analyze the impact of exchange rate policy on foreign borrowing using primary bond mar-
ket data on 42 developing countries. Our main methodology is to estimate a Heckmans
sample selection model (Heckman, 1979). In our empirical analysis, we draw on ndings
in the literature to obtain a reasonable set of control variables and include exchange rate
policy as explanatory variables for bond issuance probability and bond spread. We examine
the e¤ects of exchange rate policy on the issuance and pricing of international bonds by
developing countries.
One measure of a countrys exchange rate policy is its exchange rate regime. It remains
an open question as to how the choice of an exchange rate regime impacts a countrys
foreign debt borrowing. First, there are virtually no comprehensive empirical studies on
1Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008) document 71 default episodes for developing countries from 1975 to 2006.
They also provide a panoramicanalysis of the history of nancial crises dating from Englands fourteenth-
century default to the current United States subprime nancial crisis.
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this question.2 Second, whether a country issues a bond and how the bond is priced at
issuance are presumably a¤ected by its overall economic performance. However, there is
no consensus in the literature as to which exchange rate arrangement promotes a countrys
economic performance. The impact of exchange rate regimes on economic performance is
probably one of the most controversial topics in macroeconomic policies.
Supporters of a exible exchange rate system argue that countries with hard-pegged
currencies are more vulnerable to real shocks, which may adversely a¤ect growth and macro
stability. More exible arrangements can better accommodate shocks and thus reduce the
uncertainty in the economy.3 Based on this argument, a xed exchange rate regime results in
higher default risk in the context of foreign borrowing. Moreover, by eliminating monetary
policy as a viable policy instrument, hard pegs may force a government to increase its
external liabilities, resulting in higher default risk. Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007)
show that xed exchange rates exacerbate nancial crises by tying the hands of the monetary
authorities in a nancial accelerator framework.4
However, supporters of a xed exchange rate regime argue that this type of exchange
rate arrangement provides policy credibility. For example, pegging the exchange rate may
help to impose scal discipline on the government.5 The disciplining e¤ect of a peg may lead
to a reduction in the countrys default risk. Arellano and Heathcote (2010) show that coun-
tries with dollarization face a more favorable borrowing environment because without the
monetary policy instrument, these countries value their access to the foreign capital market
more and are thus less likely to default. Moreover, supporters of a xed exchange rate
system believe that it fosters a more stable environment and promotes economic growth.
2Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) study the e¤ect of a gold standard on country borrowing spreads on the
London bond market from the 1870s to the 1930s. Arellano and Heathcote (2010) conduct a cross-country
regression of sovereign credit ratings on the exchange rate volatility in 1985-2000.
3Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Broda (2004) provide some empirical evidence that the terms
of trade shocks have a larger e¤ect on economic performance in countries with more rigid exchange rate
regimes, than in countries with a exible exchange rate regime.
4Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) focus on the Korean experience during the 1997-1998 nancial
crisis and quantitatively examine how defending an exchange rate peg may reinforce the nancial crisis.
Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) also discuss the role of exchange rate regimes on excerbating nancial
crisis in a qualitative analysis.
5Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) show that a government may choose a particular exchange rate arrangement
to buy itself a reputation.
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As argued in the literature, hard pegs can lead to lower interest rates and eliminate ex-
change rate volatility, which stimulates investment and international trade, resulting in
faster growth.6 These growth-enhancing e¤ects suggest that a xed exchange rate regime
may be advantageous to a countrys foreign borrowing.
As the preceding discussion suggests, determining how a countrys exchange rate regime
a¤ects its default risk and its foreign debt borrowing is ultimately an empirical issue that
can only be elucidated by analyzing the historical evidence.
Our rst main nding is that the choice of an exchange rate regime has a signicant
impact on foreign borrowing by developing countries. Specically, the less exible is a
countrys exchange rate regime, the lower is the likelihood it issues foreign bonds and the
higher are the spreads it has to pay. The decrease in the bond issuance probability and
the increase in the bond credit spreads are both statistically and economically signicant.
Changing an exchange rate regime from free-oating to intermediate reduces the bond
issuance probability by about 1.5% and increases the average spread by 54 basis points. A
further change from an intermediate one to a xed one decreases the issuance probability
by 4% and increases the spread by an additional 34 basis points. Our results, therefore,
unambiguously point to the adverse e¤ect of a xed exchange rate regime on a countrys
foreign debt nancing, which is consistent with the conclusions from Gertler et al. (2007).
Next, we examine the relation between a countrys real exchange rate and its sovereign
debt borrowing. A countrys debt policy may respond to its real exchange rate overval-
uation, dened as the di¤erence between the actual real exchange rate and its long-run
equilibrium level, for the following reasons.7 First, an overvalued currency reduces a coun-
trys trade competitiveness and weakens the macroeconomic fundamentals.8 As a result, the
6See Dornbusch (2001), Rose (2000), and Rose and van Wincoop (2001). Please see Levy-Yeyati and
Stuzenegger (2003) for an extensive review.
7 It is worthwhile to point out that the degree of overvaluation does not always reect a deliberate policy
choice, whereas the exchange rate regime clearly is a delibrate policy choice. For example, in a oating
exchange rate regime with ination targeting, monetary policy is focused on the goals of ination (and
perhaps output) stabilization, and overvaluation may reect transitory market forces. In a xed exchange
rate regime, the currency may initially be pegged at an undervalued level, but movements in relative price
levels over time may cause it to become overvalued. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing it
out.
8Aghion et al. (2009) nd that countries su¤ering from real overvaluation experience slower productivity
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default risk may increase, causing an increase in the borrowing costs (Eaton and Gersovitz,
1981). Second, exchange rate overvaluation has been found to be a main cause of currency
crises. A vast amount of literature nds that the real exchange rate is overvalued prior to a
currency crisis.9 When a country borrows in a foreign currency, its debt liability becomes
more costly to serve following the devaluation and hence the default risk rises.10 Lastly,
the choice of an exchange rate regime and real exchange rate overvaluation may have a
joint impact on the sovereign debt markets. An inexible exchange rate regime compounds
the adverse e¤ects of a real overvaluation because the cost of correcting the exchange rate
misalignment is higher for a country with a xed exchange rate.11 Therefore, a country with
an inexible exchange rate regime is more likely to default on its debt when its currency is
overvalued.
Consistent with these arguments, we nd that real exchange rate overvaluation in general
gives rise to higher bond spreads for developing countries, and this e¤ect is stronger for those
with a less exible exchange rate regime. In our empirical analysis, we use three measures
of real exchange rate overvaluation to examine its impact on sovereign bond markets.12
Quantitatively we nd that a one-standard-deviation increase in the real exchange rate
overvaluation, measured by the percentage deviation of the real e¤ective exchange rate
from its 10-year average, increases the spread by 28 basis points on average. Moreover, the
increase is magnied by the inexibility of exchange rate regimes. We show that a one-
standard-deviation increase in real exchange rate overvaluation increases the spread by 64
basis points for a country with a xed exchange rate regime, while the same increase only
widens it by 34 basis points for a country under an intermediate regime and 7 basis points
growth. Eichengreen (2008) contains a survey of the literature that documents how a competitive real
exchange rate fosters growth and real overvaluation slows growth for developing countries.
9See Dornbusch et al. (1995), Edwards (1989), Eichengreen et al. (1998), Kaminsky et al. (1998),
Goldfajn and Valdes (1999), and Eichengreen (2008).
10Schneider and Tornell (2004) nd that balance of payments crises are preceded by lending booms and
real appreciation in a model with self-fullling crises and balance sheet e¤ects.
11Jahjah and Montiel (2003) nd that a hard peg increases default likelihood, especially in cases of large
exchange rate overvaluation.
12Because of a lack of concensus about a well-articulated denition of an equilibrium real exchange rate,
there is no universal method to compute exchange rate misalignment or real exchange rate overvalution
(Hinkle and Montiel, 1999). This paper is agnostic about the denition of equilibrium real exchange rate
and adopts three measures of overvaluation used in the literature for robustness.
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for one under a oating regime. The same pattern persists when the other two measures
are used.
Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests that correct for endogeneity and
allow for alternative control variables. To address the endogeneity problem for exchange rate
regimes and real overvaluation, we conduct a multistage estimation of the Heckman selection
model using a set of instrumental variables. We nd that controlling for endogeneity does
not change our results qualitatively.
Linking explicitly exchange rate policy to bond issuance and pricing is this papers main
contribution to the literature on sovereign default risk in emerging economies. Edwards
(1984), Cline (1995), Easton and Rockerbie (1999), and others investigate the determinants
of sovereign loan spreads. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) and Kamin and Kleist (1999)
analyze bond spreads on the primary markets for developing countries. However, none of
these empirical works incorporate the impact of exchange rate policy on sovereign bond
pricing and issuance. Edwards (1984) includes nominal exchange rate devaluation as one
determinant of spreads, but the impact of devaluation is not signicant. We use the real
exchange rate overvaluation in our analysis and nd it increases spreads signicantly.
There are a few empirical analyses and event studies relating exchange rate policy to
a countrys default risk. Reinhart (2002) examines the linkages between default, currency
crises, and sovereign credit rating. She nds that defaults usually follow sharp devalua-
tion or are responses to speculative attacks on exchange rate arrangements. Powell and
Sturzenegger (2000) evaluate the relation between the elimination of currency risk through
dollarization and country risk, yet their analysis is limited to countries that adopted the
U.S. dollar or euro.
This paper also relates to the recent studies on the impact of exchange rate regime and
real exchange rate volatility. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) study the relationship
between exchange rate regimes and growth, and nd that less exible exchange rate regimes
are associated with slower growth. Broda (2004) nds that countries with exible regimes
are able to bu¤er terms-of-trade shocks better than those with xed regimes. Aghion et
al. (2009) show some empirical evidence that real exchange rate volatility can a¤ect the
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long-term productivity growth rate and that the e¤ect depends critically on a countrys
level of nancial development. Our work assesses the impact of exchange rate policy on
sovereign default risk, which is another important dimension for developing countries.
In the remainder of the paper, we describe the datasets and our methodology. The main
empirical analysis is carried out in Section 3. In Section 4 we summarize the paper and
conclude.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 The Data
The bond data used are from Capital Datas Bondware and contains detailed terms of
bonds issued in the primary markets by 42 developing countries between January 1990 and
December 2006.13 The Bondware data set contains information on the launch spreads and
launch dates of international bonds denominated in dollars issued by developing countries.
The launch spread of an issued bond is dened as the di¤erence between its yield and the
comparable U.S. Treasury yield. We use the Bondware data at the individual bond level
at a monthly frequency. There are a total of 2,653 bond issues in the sample. The list of
countries and the total number of bond issues in the sample period are reported in Table 1.
Using the primary market data allows us to analyze both the issuing and pricing decisions
of developing countries.
Insert Table 1 Here
We use the de facto exchange rate regime as a key explanatory variable in our empir-
ical analysis. We employ the monthly classication of the de facto exchange rate regimes
constructed by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002) (hereafter, RR), who classify the exchange rate
arrangements based on the o¢ cial exchange rates and parallel market rates. We use the
13There are initially 66 countries covered in the Capital Datas Bondware data during the sample period.
Among them, 4 countries are dropped because they have no Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002) regime classication,
and 20 countries are further dropped from the sample due to the unavailability of some explanatory variables.
The number of bond issues by the 24 countries excluded in our analysis is less than one tenth of the total
bond issues.
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de facto exchange rate regime as opposed to the de jure exchange rate regime because the
latter is not a good measure of a countrys exchange rate arrangement.14 In most of the
analysis, we aggregate the RR exchange rate regime classication into three groups: xed,
intermediate, and free oating.15 The aggregation of exchange rate regimes is summarized
in Table 2.16 In the empirical analysis, we use the following exchange rate regime dummies:
FIX (xed regimes), INT (intermediate regimes), and FLOAT (free oating regimes). FIX
(resp., INT or FLOAT) takes the value of 1 when the country is operating under a xed
exchange rate regime (resp., an intermediate or free oating regime) and 0 otherwise.
Insert Table 2 Here
Next, we measure real exchange rate overvaluation in three di¤erent ways.17 The rst
two measures are computed using monthly real e¤ective exchange rates (REER) from the
IMF Information Notice System. The REER is a trade-weighted index of multilateral
real rates measured by units of foreign goods per domestic goods. The rst measure of real
exchange rate overvaluation, labeled as ROV1, is the percentage deviation of the REER from
its 10-year average. The second measure, ROV2, is the percentage change in the REER over
the past ve years.18 The third measure, ROV3, is the deviation of the Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP) real exchange rate from a certain predicted level. The PPP real exchange
rates are retrieved from the Penn World Table (PWT). The predicted level of the PPP
real exchange rate is based on the equilibrium concept of Purchasing Power Parity and is
14A country may in practice deviate from its announced exchange rate regime. Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
and Alesina and Wagner (2003) study the reasons why countries do not follow their de jure exchange rate
regimes. Results are similar when we use the IMF de jure or de facto exchange rate regimes. These results,
not reported in this paper, are available upon request.
15We also repeated the empirical analysis using the exchange rate regimes grouped into either four classes
(hard peg, conventional peg, intermediate, and free oating) or two classes (xed and oating). These
alternative grouping ways do not change the results. The estimation results are available upon request.
16Two adjustments are made to the RR classication. A free falling regime is dened as one with a
monthly ination rate greater than 40%. Because ination is one regressor in our empirical analysis, we
categorize this group using the secondary classication. We discard the observations in the dual-market
regime because no secondary classication is available. Our empirical analysis is robust to the exclusion of
these two groups.
17Because of a lack of consensus about a well-articulated denition of an equilibrium real exchange rate,
there is no universal method to compute exchange rate misalignment or real exchange rate overvalution
(Hinkle and Montiel, 1999). This paper is agnostic about the denition of equilibrium real exchange rate.
18These two measures are also used in Frankel and Saravelos (2010).
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adjusted from di¤erences in the relative prices of nontradeables to tradeables attributed to
di¤erences in factor endowments (i.e., the Balassa-Samuelsone¤ect).19 Following Dollar
(1992) and Aghion et al. (2009), we rst perform a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression to obtain the predicted value as an estimate of the equilibrium value of the real
exchange rate, and then take the di¤erence between the actual PPP real exchange rate
and its predicted value from the OLS regression as the third measure of real exchange rate
overvaluation. In the pooled OLS regression, income per capita relative to that of the United
States as well as geographical and year dummies are used as proxies for factor endowments.
We draw on the ndings in the literature to obtain a comprehensive set of control
variables that have been found to be important determinants of bond spreads.20 We use
the real interest rate on ten-year U.S. Treasury bond (USRATE) and the U.S. high yield
corporate bond spread (HYD) as proxies for the global economic condition. For the do-
mestic economic indicators, we use the GDP growth rate (GDPGR), the GDP per capita
in U.S. dollars (GDPPC), the current account as a fraction of GDP (CA2GDP), and in-
ation (INF). We also include some liquidity and solvency variables, such as total dollar
amount and number of bonds issued in the previous year (AMOUNT, ISSUES), the ratio
of debt to GNP (DT2GNP), the ratio of debt service to exports (DS2EX), and the ratio of
short-term debt to total debt (SHORTDT). In addition, following Eichengreen and Mody
(2000) and DellAriccia et al. (2006) we include the residual of credit ratings (RATING)
from a regression of the ratings on all macroeconomic control variables. Furthermore, we
employ regional dummies for countries in Africa (AFRI) and Latin America (LAT). We
collect data on macroeconomic indicators and country-issuer characteristics from the IMFs
International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Banks World Development Indicators
(WDI), the Penn World Table (PWT), Global Development Finance (GDF), and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. All macroeconomic variables are lagged by one year to account for
19We also measure the exchange rate overvaluation using the di¤erence between log of the real exchange
rate and its H-P trend. The results are robust, but not reported in the paper. They are available upon
request.
20Our baseline specication closely follows those reported in Edwards (1984), Eichengreen and Mody
(2000), DellAriccia et al. (2006), etc. We also include control variables that are not in these earlier studies
but have been extensively discussed as important determinants of international bond spreads.
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reporting delays and to reduce potential endogeneity problems. A detailed description of
the variables and their sources is available in Table A1 in the appendix.
2.2 The Econometric Methodology
Our main econometric model is based on the Heckman sample selection model. The credit
spread of an international bond issued by a developing country is a measure of its default
risk. As in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Edwards (1984), and subsequent studies in the
literature, we assume that the logarithm of the spread is a linear function of explanatory
variables, X, that a¤ect the default risk. Formally,
log (SPREAD) = X + u; (1)
where u is a random error term. The explanatory variables are exchange rate regime
dummies, real exchange rate overvaluation measures, and control variables that summarize
the global economic conditions and country characteristics.
Because we only observe the launch spread when a bond is issued, a sample selection
problem arises. When no spread is observed for a country in a given year, we may assume
that the missing spreads are random occurrences and ignore them; but, if the gaps occur
according to some unknown but systematic selection methods, estimating Equation (1)
alone leads to biased and ine¢ cient estimates. For example, a country may be excluded
from the international credit markets if its perceived probability of default exceeds a given
level, i.e., if it reaches a creditceiling.21 Conversely, a country tends to issue international
bonds when the borrowing conditions are favorable and its need for nancing is high. To
deal with the sample selection problem, we create a binary variable for the bond issuance:
BI equals 1 when we observe a nonzero spread for a country at time t, and zero otherwise.
We assume
BI = 1fZ+v>0g; (2)
where Z is a set of observed variables that explain the issuing decision of a country in
21See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Sachs and Cohen (1982), and Sachs (1983).
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a given month and v is a random error term. We can think of Z + v as the di¤erence
between benet and cost from issuing bonds. Thus equation (2) indicates that a bond issue
is observed if and only if the benet exceeds the cost.
The spread equation (1) and the issuance equation (2) set up a standard Heckman (1979)
sample selection model. We can estimate equation (2) as a probit model to determine the
issuance probability. Estimating the probit model requires information on those countries
who did not issue bonds. To address this problem, we record a zero for each month-country
pair for which no bond issuance is observed. The model can be identied by the exclusion
requirement for the Heckman selection model. In our empirical analysis, the vector of
explanatory variables Z in the issuance equation (2) includes all the variables in X as well
as one exclusion variable that is used for identication. The exclusion variable is a dummy
for January in the bond issuance equation based on the following logic: countries are less
likely to issue new bonds in January due to the holiday season. However, the January
dummy should not enter the spread equation because whether or not a particular bond is
issued in January should not change the evaluation of its default risk.
We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate equations (1) and (2) jointly under
the assumption that the error terms, u and v, follow a bivariate normal distribution. The
maximum likelihood method obtains e¢ cient estimates under a correctly specied model.
We also check the results by estimating the model using Heckmans two-stage method.22
The two procedures give similar results.
In the empirical analysis, we also quantify the impact of exchange rate regimes and real
overvaluation on the issuing and pricing of international bonds by calculating the marginal
e¤ects. The marginal e¤ects consist of two components. The rst component captures a
direct e¤ect on the mean of log (SPREAD), while the second component captures an indi-
rect e¤ect because the exchange rate regime or real overvaluation inuences log (SPREAD)
indirectly by a¤ecting the bond issuance decision.
22The two-stage estimation method of the Heckman model is implemented as follows. In the rst stage,
equation (2) is estimated as a probit model to determine the probability of a bond issue. Then, the value
of Mills ratio (reecting the conditional probability of the observation being in the observed sample) is
incorporated in an OLS regression of (2) using the observed spreads.
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First, the marginal e¤ect on the bond spread of changing a countrys exchange rate
regime from FLOAT to INT is given by
E [log (SPREAD) jINT   log (SPREAD) jFLOAT jBI = 1] (3)
= INT + u
"

 
 Z(0;1)
v
!
  
 
 Z(0;0)
v
!#
;
where INT is the coe¢ cient of INT in Equation (1),  (x) is the inverse Mills ratio, and
Z(0;0) is dened as the vector of explanatory variables in the bond issuance equation (2)
with (FIX; INT ) = (0; 0) and all the other variables at their mean values. Z(0;1) and Z(1;0)
are similarly dened with (FIX; INT ) equal to (0; 1) and (1; 0), respectively. Similarly, if
the exchange rate regime changes from INT to FIX, then the marginal e¤ect is given by
E [log (SPREAD) jFIX   log (SPREAD) jINT jBI = 1] (4)
= FIX   INT + u
"

 
 Z(1;0)
v
!
  
 
 Z(0;1)
v
!#
;
where FIX is the coe¢ cient of FIX in Equation (1).
Lastly, the marginal e¤ect of real overvaluation at the sample mean in the observed
sample is given by
@E [log (SPREAD) jBI = 1]
@ROV
= ROV   ROV u
 Z
v

; (5)
where ROV and ROV denote the coe¢ cients of real exchange rate overvaluation (ROV1,
ROV2, or ROV3) in equations (1)-(2),  (x)   (x)2   x (x), and Z is the vector of
explanatory variables in the bond issuance equation (2). The marginal e¤ect of ROV in a
given exchange rate regime is similarly dened.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically investigate the e¤ects of exchange rate regimes (FIX, INT,
or FLOAT) and real exchange rate overvaluation (ROV1-ROV3) on the issuing and pricing
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of international bonds by developing countries. In the next section we conduct various
robustness tests including endogeneity tests.
3.1 Exchange Rate Regimes
We now examine our baseline model that features exchange rate regime dummies (FIX
and INT) together with a set of explanatory variables. The estimation result is presented
in Table 3. Ignoring the sample selection issue for the time being, we rst run a pooled
OLS regression using the bond spread as the dependent variable. The regression results are
reported in Column (I) of Table 3. We then estimate the Heckman model, as specied in
Equations 1 and 2, using the full sample including the month-country pairs for which there
were no bonds issued. The maximum likelihood estimation result is reported in Column
(II) of Table 3.
Insert Table 3 Here
Our results suggest that choosing a less exible exchange rate regime increases bond
spreads. The coe¢ cients on the regime dummies (FIX and INT) are signicantly positive
and are similar in the OLS regression and the Heckman model. In addition, the estimation
result of the Heckman model also shows that hard peggers have lower bond issuance prob-
abilities. Therefore, it is both more di¢ cult and more costly for countries with less-exible
regimes to borrow, suggesting these countries are penalized for not choosing a more-exible
exchange rate arrangement. Further, the coe¢ cient on FIX is signicantly higher (lower)
than the coe¢ cient on INT in the spread (issuance) equation, implying a monotone relation
between the exibility of the exchange rate arrangement and the bond spread. The results
indicate that a countrys exchange rate regime impacts foreign borrowing by shifting the
demand curve of its international bonds. Specically, the market is less inclined to demand
the bonds of a country that has a less exible exchange rate regime. As a result, it is less
likely to observe an issue and the corresponding decline in demand increases spreads on
observed issues.
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The impact of the exchange rate regime is not only statistically signicant, but also
economically signicant. To see the latter, we quantify the marginal e¤ect of making a
countrys exchange rate regime less exible on the bond spread as shown in equations (3)
and (4). In the data, the average spread among the oaters is 319 basis points. From
the OLS regression result in Table 3, we can see that changing from a oating exchange
rate regime to an intermediate one increases the average spread by 63 (=319*(exp(0.18)-
1)) basis points, and changing from an intermediate to xed regime increases it further
by an additional 37 (=319*(exp(0.29-0.18)-1)) basis points. The OLS regression ignores
the potential sample selection bias. After we take into account the sample selection issue,
the margin e¤ect is slightly smaller. Based on the Heckman model, converting a oating
(intermediate) exchange rate regime to an intermediate (oating) one increases the average
bond spread by 54 (34) basis points. Thus the direct use of the OLS regression without
accounting for the potential sample selection bias tends to slightly overestimate the impact.
Using the estimation result of the issuance equation in Table 3, we compute the marginal
e¤ect from a change in the exchange rate regime on the bond issuance probability. We nd
that a country in an intermediate exchange rate regime is 4% less likely to issue a bond if
it switches to a xed regime, but about 1.5% more likely to issue a bond if it becomes a
oater. Overall, we nd that countries with less exible exchange rate regimes issue less
debt and pay a signicantly higher bond spread.
As shown in Table 3, the control variables behave largely as expected. We also nd that
a higher U.S. real interest rate (USRATE) suppresses incentives of developing countries to
issue bonds and at the same time makes spreads narrower.23 A larger high-yield corporate
bond spread (HYD) signicantly reduces issuance probability and tends to increase the
spread. This result conrms the observation that the market requires similar risk premia on
high-yield corporate bonds and emerging market country bonds. GDP growth (GDPGR),
high GDP per capita (GDPPC), a favorable credit rating (RATING), and a low debt to
GNP ratio (DT2GNP) enhance the market demand for international bonds, which increases
23Eichengreen and Moday (2000), Kamin and Keist (1999), and Uribe and Yue (2006) also nd that the
U.S. real interest rates reduces the contemporaneous country spread.
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the issuance probability and decreases the spread. A higher ination, however, signicantly
increases the bond spread, but does not a¤ect the likelihood of bond issuance.24 The
regional dummies for Africa and Latin America have positive (negative) coe¢ cients in the
spread (issuance) equation. The coe¢ cient of current account (CA2GDP) in the spread
equation and those of the other two debt indices (DS2EX and SHORTDT) in the issuance
equation show signs that are either inconsistent or hard to interpret. This may be due
to the collinearity between them and the other macro variables, particularly the debt to
GNP ratio, or result from some endogeneity problems. Lastly, the dummy for the January
e¤ect signicantly reduces the probability of issuing bonds, validating its use as an exclusion
variable. The correlation between the error terms in the issuance and spread equations is
signicantly negative with a value of -0.357. The negative correlation implies that there
exist some unobserved factors that simultaneously lead to a higher issuance probability and
a lower spread. Thus, these factors should be interpreted as unobserved determinants of
demand. Finally, the coe¢ cients of AMOUNT in both spread and issuance equations are
signicantly positive. This proxies for the supply of bonds (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000).
Countries that issued a large amount of bonds in the previous year tend to accumulate an
unsatised appetite for borrowing and supply additional new issues. The resulting outward
shift in the bond supply reduces the bond price and increase the spread.
We also estimate a Heckman selection model for the dollar amount of issuance. In
other words, we replace the dependent variable in (1) by the observed amount of individual
bonds and use the same set of explanatory variables including the exchange rate regimes
for the Heckman model. The result is reported in Column (III) of Table 3. First, all of
the coe¢ cients in the issuance equation have the same signs as in Column II, which is
expected based on the probit model estimation. Second and more importantly, the result
shows how the dollar amount of issuance is linked to the exchange rate regimes as well
as global and local economic fundamentals. Most coe¢ cients show signs that are easy to
interpret. A country with a less exible exchange rate regime not only is less likely to issue
24Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008) document the high correlation between high ination and the occurrence of
debt crisis using data that cover a period of over 200 years.
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bonds but also borrows less in dollar amount. Hence combining the estimation results for
the bond spread and the issuance amount in Columns (II) and (III) of Table 3, we nd
the signicantly adverse e¤ect of an inexible exchange rate arrangement on a countrys
sovereign bond nancing in terms of both price and quantity.
3.2 Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation
Next, we investigate the relationship of a countrys real exchange rate overvaluation on the
bond issuance and pricing. We include measures of real exchange rate overvaluation as well
as their interactions with the exchange rate regime dummies in the Heckman model. As
stated in Section 2.1, we use three measures of real exchange rate overvaluation (ROV1-
ROV3) and report the estimation results in Tables 4A-4C, respectively. Each table contains
three columns, Column (I)-Column (III). We rst use the real exchange rate overvaluation
alone as an explanatory variable in the Heckman selection model and report the result in
Column (I). Then we add exchange rare regime dummies as additional explanatory variables
(Column II). Lastly, to better identify the joint impact of overvaluation and a regime, we
added the interaction terms of the real exchange rate overvaluation and the exchange rate
dummies (Column III).25
Insert Tables 4A-4C Here
We nd that the real exchange rate overvaluation signicantly increases both the bond
spread and the bond issuance probability. This e¤ect is statistically signicant and holds for
all three measures of real exchange rate overvaluation, ROV1-ROV3. This result may be due
to three factors. First, an overvalued currency makes a countrys exports less competitive.
Thus real exchange rate overvaluation is usually found to be associated with low economic
growth and loss of government revenue.26 Hence, the borrowing country may experience
greater di¢ culty in servicing its debt. When the gain from correcting the exchange rate
misalignment is high and cost associated with default is low, default probability increases.
25By construction, these interaction terms sum to the measure of the real exchange rate overvaluation.
26Prasad et al. (2006), Eichengreen (2008), and Aghion et al. (2009) study the impact of real exchange
rate overvaluation on the economic growth.
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Second, a real exchange rate overvaluation is highly likely to be corrected in the form of a
currency devaluation or crisis, which increases a countrys default risk due to the currency
mismatch on the balance sheet. Powell and Sturzenegger (2000), for example, nd a strong
link between devaluation and default risk. Lastly, because overvaluation may signal good
times with the economic prosperity (e.g., due to benign real shocks) and developing countries
typically borrow procyclically, a country experiencing real overvaluation tends to borrow
more and the increased supply in turn results in a higher bond spread.27
Using the estimation result in Column (I) of Tables 4A-4C, we compute the marginal
e¤ect of real exchange rate overvaluation on the spread as specied in equation (5). We nd
that if the real exchange rate becomes more overvalued by one sample standard deviation,
the average bond spread increases by 64, 34, and 7 basis points, respectively, when the real
exchange rate overvaluation is measured by ROV1, ROV2, and ROV3, respectively.
The impacts of the real exchange rate overvaluation and the exchange rate regime remain
signicant when both are included in the regression, as shown in Column (II) of Tables 4A-
4C. A xed or intermediate exchange rate regime has an independent positive e¤ect on the
bond spread and an independent negative e¤ect on the bond issuance probability, consistent
with the result in Table 3. The coe¢ cients on the regime dummies are slightly lower, but
remain a monotone function of the exchange rate exibility.
Lastly, we investigate the combined e¤ect of real exchange rate overvaluation and an
exchange rate regime. From Column (III) of Tables 4A-4C, we nd that among the three
interaction terms, ROV FIX has the largest and most signicantly positive coe¢ cients in
the issuance and spread equations (except that the coe¢ cient becomes insignicant in the
issuance equation for ROV2). Furthermore, the results of Chi-square tests show that the co-
e¢ cients on the interaction term, ROVxFIX, are statistically and signicantly distinct from
those on ROVxFLOAT with p-values equal to 0.0034, 0.0224, and 0.000, respectively, for
the three overvaluation measures. This result suggests that the e¤ects of the real exchange
rate overvaluation tend to be magnied for countries with xed exchange rate regimes. We
27Arellano (2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), and Yue (2010) document and show the procyclicality of
sovereign borrowing in an Eaton-Gersotivz framework. We thank a referee for suggsting this explanation.
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can think of two possible explanations for these results. First, when a country has a hard
peg or limited exchange rate exibility, the real overvaluation tends to be persistent.28 As
a result, servicing foreign debt can be less costly in domestic currency. Hence, countries
with less exible exchange rate arrangements are more likely to borrow in periods of real
overvaluation. The increase in the supply of bonds from countries with xed exchange rate
regimes and real overvaluation drives down the bond price and results in a higher bond
spread. Second, under a hard peg, the overvaluation has a larger and more-persistent ad-
verse impact on the economy.29 Debt becomes rapidly unsustainable and the probability of
default increases. By contrast, owing to the exchange rate exibility, nominal devaluation
can greatly help to speed up the real exchange rate realignment for a free-oating regime.
Therefore, real exchange rate overvaluation has the least impact on the bond spread for
countries with free-oating regimes.
We compute the marginal e¤ect of exchange rate overvaluation to assess the economic
signicance of their combined e¤ect with the exchange rate regimes. For example, when
the exchange rate overvaluation is measured using ROV1 (see Column (III) of Table 4A),
we nd that a one-standard-deviation rise of ROV1 increases the spread by 86 basis points
for a country with a xed exchange rate regime, while the same rise of ROV1 increases the
spread by only 33 and 29 basis points, respectively, if the country is in an intermediate or
oating exchange rate regime, respectively. The same pattern persists when the other two
measures, ROV2 and ROV3, are used.
In summary, we nd that a real exchange rate overvaluation increases both the bond
issuance probability and bond spreads, and such e¤ect is strongest when the country has a
xed exchange rate regime.
28Edwards (1988) nds that the autonomous forces that move the real exchange rate back to equilibrium
operate very slowly, keeping the country out of equlibrium for a long time.
29Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) argue that the adjustment in equilibrium real exchange rate upon a
real external shock takes longer in countries with a xed exchange rate.
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4 Robustness
In this section we address the potential endogeneity problem associated with exchange rate
regimes and real exchange rate overvaluation. We also include more macroeconomic control
variables to examine the robustness of our main ndings.
First, we add more macroeconomic control variables. We include the debt crisis dummy
(DCRISIS), debt rescheduling dummy (DRES), and total reserve to GNI (RES2GNI) as ad-
ditional regressors. The debt crisis dataset is taken from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008). The
debt rescheduling dummy, constructed from GDF, is equal to one (1) if there is a nonzero
amount of debt rescheduled for a country and zero otherwise. All of these variables poten-
tially impact the sovereign bond borrowing and pricing. Because of the data availability,
there are 40 countries left in the sample when these controls are used.
Column (I) in Table 5A contains the results. A comparison to Table 3 shows that
the ndings regarding the e¤ect of exchange rate regimes on the issuing and pricing of
international bonds are robust after we control for more macroeconomic variables. Both
FIX and INT have signicantly positive coe¢ cient in the spread equation. The coe¢ cient on
FIX in the issuance equation is also negative, although it is not statistically signicant. The
debt rescheduling dummy, DRES, does not a¤ect the spread nor the issuance probability
signicantly, but the coe¢ cients are positive. The debt crisis dummy, DCRISIS, signicantly
reduces the bond issuance probability, implying that a country that is in crisis is more
di¢ cult to issue new bonds. The ratio of total reserve to GNI, RES2GNI, decreases both
the spread and the likelihood of issuance signicantly, which is a very intuitive result.
Next, we address the concerns that the exchange rate regime and real exchange rate
overvaluation may be endogenous. In particular, the choice of an exchange rate regime may
be a response to a debt crisis or a mechanism to lower borrowing costs.
As a rst attempt at xing the endogeneity issue, we single out observations associated
with countries with de facto pegs throughout our sample period (FIXALL) following Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and include it in the Heckman model (see Columns (I)
of Table 5A). As argued by these authors, because this group of countries correspond to
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economies within long-standing currency unions, it seems reasonable to assume that their
original regime choices are independent from their bond issuance and pricing decisions over
time. In Columns (I) of Table 5A, the positive impact of a xed exchange rate regime on
the bond spread is signicant for this group of countries relative to the rest of the countries
in our sample. This presents initial evidence that the main ndings in our paper are not
severely contaminated by the endogeneity problem.
We next correct for the endogeneity of the exchange rate regime and real exchange rate
overvaluation using a feasible generalized two-stage IV (2SIV) estimator. We rst run a
multivariate logit model of the exchange rate regime choice, R 2 fFIX, INT or FLOATg.
The multinomial logit model assumes that the probability of one outcome can be expressed
as follows:
Pr (R = FIX) =
exp (Y 1)
1 + exp (Y 1) + exp (Y 2)
Pr (R = INT ) =
exp (Y 2)
1 + exp (Y 1) + exp (Y 2)
Pr (R = FLOAT ) =
1
1 + exp (Y 1) + exp (Y 2)
where Y is the vector of variables used to explain the choice of an exchange rate regime,
and s are the associated coe¢ cients. The relative probability of choosing FIX (INT)
versus FLOAT is exp (Yt1) (exp (Yt2)). Similarly, to deal with the potential endogeneity
problem associated with real exchange rate overvaluation, we run three OLS regressions on
the variables in the vector Y to obtain the tted values for three measures, ROV1-ROV3.
Then we use these tted values as well as those for exchange rate regime dummies from the
multinomial logit regression above to estimate the Heckman model. Table 5A (Column II)
and Table 5B report the regression results.
The key goal here is to nd suitable instrumental variables for the exchange rate regime
and real overvaluation. For the exchange rate regime, following Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneg-
ger (2003), we use the ratio of the countrys GDP over the U.S. GDP (SIZE), the geo-
graphical area of the country (AREA), an island dummy (ISLAND), the ratio of reserve to
monetary base (RESBASE), and a regional exchange rate indicator (REGEXCH) that is
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equal to the average exchange rate regime of the countrys neighbors dened as those under
the same IMF department. For the real overvaluation. we use the share of working-age
persons in the population (WORKPOP) and a dummy variable for oil-exporting countries
(OILEX) as the instrumental variables, as in Prasad et al. (2006) and Eichengreen (2008),
We use these instrumental variables and all of the exogenous regressors in the baseline
model to obtain the tted values for the exchange rate regime and overvaluation based on
the auxiliary regressions. Column (I) of Table 5C reports the result of the multinomial logit
auxiliary regression of the exchange rate regime over all of the instruments. The coe¢ cients
are interpreted as the variation in the relative probability of choosing one regime over a
free-oating one. Column (II) shows the estimates of the three OLS regressions for three
di¤erent measures of real exchange rate overvaluation. Most variables are highly signicant
and have the expected signs. For the choice of the exchange rate regime, smaller countries
tend to be more open and thus are more likely to choose xed exchange rate regimes. A
high initial level of reserves helps a country to overcome the fear of oating.Finally, the
regional exchange rate indicator may indicate explicit or implicit exchange rate coordination
among neighboring countries.30 Regarding the OLS regressions for the real overvaluation,
a higher share of working-age population reduces the likelihood of real overvaluation.31
Oil-exporting countries are more prone to overvaluation.
Insert Tables 5A-5C Here
Column (II) of Table 5A reports the estimation results using the predicted probabilities
of choosing a xed or intermediate exchange rate regime as the instruments for regime
dummies. Our main ndings hold after correcting for endogeneity. The coe¢ cients on FIX
and INT are still signicantly positive in the spread equation and negative in the issuance
equation. In general, an inexible exchange rate regime decreases bond issuing probability
30See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) for more details on the multinomial logit model for the exchange
rate regime.
31Prasad et al. (2006) argue that a rapidly growing labor force should lead to undervaluation due to the
pressure on policy makers to maintain a competitive real exchange rate in order to absorb additional workers
into employment. Eichengreen (2008) also documents a similar relation between the share of working age
population and real overvaluation.
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and increase bond spreads, which is consistent with our main ndings in Section 3.
The estimation results for the real overvaluation after the endogeneity correction are
reported in Table 5B. For all three measures of the real overvaluation (ROV1-ROV3), the
interaction terms with FIX and INT remain positive and signicant with the coe¢ cients
in a magnitude similar to those in the baseline model. Moreover, the coe¢ cients of these
interaction terms continue to decrease with the exibility of the regime. We use Chi-square
tests to test whether these coe¢ cients are statistically di¤erent from each other. The results
of Chi-square tests show that the coe¢ cients on the interaction term, ROVxFIX, are statis-
tically and signicantly distinct from those on ROVxFLOAT with p-values equal to 0.0000,
0.0347, 0.0033, respectively, for the three overvaluation measures. In addition, the impact of
the interaction terms on the bond issuance probability is also robust. Overall, the relation
between exchange rate policy and the bond issuing and pricing is robust to the correction
of endogeneity for both exchange rate regime and real exchange rate overvaluation.
5 Conclusion
This study is the rst empirical work on the impact of exchange rate policy on the issuing
and pricing of international bonds. We nd that exchange rate policy a¤ects the bond spread
in a signicant and interlaced way. First, countries with less exible exchange rate regimes
tend to pay higher spreads and are less likely to issue bonds. Second, when the currencies
are overvalued, countries tend to issue more debt. But an overvalued real exchange rate
has a negative impact on debt sustainability, and thus increases bond spreads, especially
for countries in hard peg regimes.
The choice of exchange rate policy is not neutral with respect to the bond issuing and
pricing decisions. Attempts to gain credibility in the international market through the use
of a pegged exchange rate have gained popularity. Our results emphasize that the choice
of a hard peg does not necessarily lead to cheaper borrowing costs, especially if there is a
severe risk of currency overvaluation. Overvaluation under hard pegs incites governments
to borrow more in the international market; however, foreign investors internalize the risks
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associated with the overvaluation, increasing borrowing costs.
A few research questions still remain. In particular, one would want to construct a the-
oretical framework to examine a governments optimal choice in terms of foreign borrowing
and default under di¤erent exchange rate regimes in a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model. The empirical ndings in this paper show the need to develop new theories
that incorporate exchange rate regimes and real exchange rates into the analysis of sovereign
default for developing countries. Such analysis also has important policy implications for
European countries in the euro zone.
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Appendix: Denition of Variables
Table A1: Variables, Denitions and Sources
Variable Denitions and Sources
AFRI Dummy variable for African countries
AMOUNT U.S. $ equivalent amount of bond (Source: Bondware)32
CA2GDP Current account balance as % of GDP
(Source: WDI, variable: BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS )
DCRISIS Dummy for debt crisis (Source: Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008))
DRES Dummy for debt rescheduling (Source: GDF, series: DT.TXR.DPPG.CD)
DS2EX Total debt service (% of exports)
(Source: WDI, variable: DT.TDS.DECT.EX.ZS)
DT2GNP External debt stocks (% of GNI)
(Source: WDI, variable: DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS)
GDPGR GDP growth rate (Source: WDI, variable: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG)
GDPPC GDP per capita (current US$) (Source: WDI, variable: NY.GDP.PCAP.CD)
HYD Log of Moodys seasoned Baa corporate bond yield less USRATE
(Source: Federal Reserve Board)
INF Ination, consumer prices (Source: WDI, variable: FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG)
ISSUES Total number of bond issues in a given year (Source: Bondware)
LAT Dummy variable for Latin American countries
RATING Residual from regression of ratings on fundamentals (Source: S&P,
Moodys, variable: average of available ratings or only available rating)
RES2GNI Total reserves (% of GNI) (Source: WDI, variable: FI.RES.TOTL.DT.ZS
DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS/100)
ROV1 REER Deviation from 10-year average, monthly (Source: IMF)
ROV2 REER 5-year percentage appreciation, monthly (Source: IMF)
ROV3 Exchange rate misalignment measure (Source: PWT)33
SHORTDT Short-term debt (% of total external debt)
(Source: WDI, variable: DT.DOD.DSTC.ZS)
SPREAD Launch spreads in basis point, monthly (Source: Bondware)
USRATE The yield on ten-year U.S. treasury bonds at time of issue (log)
(Source: Federal Reserve Board)
32Unless otherwise specied, the explanatory variables are obtained at an annual frequency and are lagged
for one year to avoid the simultaneity issue.
33This measure is constructed by following Dollar (1992) and Aghion et al. (2009). Specically, we perform
the following pooled OLS regression: log (REERi;t) = +dt+ log (GDPPCi;t)+LACi+AFRIi+i;t,
where dt is the year dummy. The regression results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2009): b = 0:210c,b = 0:077c, b = 0:068c, and the adjusted R-square is 0:24, where c denotes 1% signicance.
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Table 1: List of Countries and the Number of Bond Issues
This table lists the names of the 42 countries used and the number of bond issues in the
sample.
Country # Country # Country #
Argentina 289 El Salvador 14 Peru 19
Azerbaijan 2 Grenada 1 Philippines 130
Bolivia 1 Guatemala 8 Poland 20
Brazil 692 India 60 Romania 5
Bulgaria 3 Indonesia 107 Russia 190
Chile 71 Jamaica 20 South Africa 22
China, P. R. 93 Jordan 5 Sri Lanka 4
Colombia 58 Kazakhstan 69 Thailand 78
Congo, Republic of 1 Latvia 1 Turkey 97
Costa Rica 11 Malaysia 54 Ukraine 36
Croatia 4 Mauritius 7 United Arab Emirates 32
Dominican Republic 8 Mexico 336 Uruguay 30
Ecuador 5 Moldova 2 Venezuela 56
Egypt 3 Pakistan 8 Vietnam 1
Table 2: Exchange Rate Regime Classication
Exchange rate regimes are aggregated into three groups: xed, intermediate, and oating
regimes. We use the exchange rate classication from Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002).
Aggregate Class Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002) Classication
Fixed (1) No separate legal tender
(FIX) (2) Pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement
Intermediate (3) Pre-announced horizontal band that is less than or equal to 2%
(INT) (4) De facto peg
(5) Pre-announced crawling peg
(6) Pre-announced crawling band that is less than or equal to 2%
(7) De factor crawling peg
(8) De facto crawling band that is less than or equal to 2%
(9) Pre-announced crawling band that is greater than or equal to 2%
(10) De facto crawling band that is less than or equal to 5%
(11) Moving band that is less than or equal to 2%
(i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
Floating (12) Managed oating
(FLOAT) (13) Freely oating
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Table 3 Baseline Model with Exchange Rate Regime
This table presents the regression results regarding the role of the exchange rate regime
in a¤ecting launch spreads. Column (I) shows the pooled OLS regression result with (log)
spread as the dependent variable. Columns (II) and (III) show the MLE estimation results
based on the Heckman sample selection model with (log) spread and (log) amount as the
dependent variable, respectively. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses for key variables
of exchange rate regimes (FIX and INT). We calculate t-statistics using robust standard
errors.34
OLS (I) Heckit Model (II) Heckit Model (III)
Spread Spread Issuance Amount Issuance
FIX 0.289c 0.291c -0.180b -0.185b -0.158a
(5.455) (5.742) (-2.036) (-2.106) (-1.847)
INT 0.181c 0.199c -0.051 -0.123a -0.050
(4.012) (4.594) (-0.720) (-1.646) (-0.723)
AMOUNT 0.046c 0.029b 0.158c -0.003 0.170c
ISSUES -0.001 -0.002a 0.033c -0.005b 0.030c
RATING -0.105c -0.108c 0.013 0.004 0.017a
USRATE -0.295 -0.251 -0.559 -1.320b -0.048
HYD 0.773 0.937 -1.465 -1.493 -1.148
GDPGR -0.020c -0.023c 0.013a -0.017b 0.017b
GDPPC -0.088c -0.095c 0.038 0.033 0.028
CA2GDP 0.032c 0.028c 0.044c -0.023c 0.045c
DT2GNP 0.004c 0.005c -0.004c 0.003a -0.003c
DS2EX 0.358c 0.217a 0.911c -1.076c 0.836c
SHORTDT -0.003 -0.004 0.007c -0.005 0.007c
INF 0.016c 0.014c 0.005 -0.011a 0.011
AFRI 0.127 0.260a -0.642c 0.421b -0.627c
LAC 0.131c 0.140c -0.030 0.157a 0.001
JAN -0.155a -0.115
CONSTANT 5.990c 6.246c -0.243 7.916c -1.026
No. of bonds 1824 1824 2098
No. of obs. 1824 4661 4935
rho -0.357 -0.047
lambda -0.192 -0.041
34The superscripts a; b; c denote the signicance level  a : signicant at 10%; b : signicant at 5%; c :
signicant at 1%. We use them in all of the other tables as well.
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Table 4A: Model with Exchange Rate Regime and Real Overvaluation (ROV1)
This table presents the regression results based on the Heckman sample selection model
regarding the role of exchange rate regimes and exchange rate overvaluation in a¤ecting
launch spreads. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses for key variables of exchange rate
regimes (ROV1, FIX, INT and their interaction terms). ROV1 is dened as the percentage
deviation of the REER from its ten-year average. We calculate t-statistics using robust
standard errors.
Heckit Model (I) Heckit Model (II) Heckit Model (III)
Spread Issuance Spread Issuance Spread Issuance
ROV1 0.005c 0.006c 0.006c 0.006c
(5.750) (4.629) (5.196) (3.896)
ROV1 0.172c 0.019c
FIX (3.984) (4.958)
ROV1 0.009c 0.004b
INT (5.131) (2.170)
ROV1 0.006c 0.003
FLOAT (4.360) (0.882)
FIX 0.173c -0.218b 0.098 -0.421c
(2.999) (-2.375) (1.440) (-3.766)
INT 0.156c -0.048 0.172c -0.026
(3.682) (-0.658) (3.984) (-0.352)
AMOUNT 0.027c 0.198c 0.027b 0.185c 0.031b 0.188c
ISSUES -0.001 0.026c -0.002a 0.027c -0.003b 0.026c
RATING -0.097c 0.031c -0.096c 0.019a -0.097c 0.026b
USRATE -0.141 -0.485 -0.036 -0.439 -0.002 -0.428
HYD 1.128a -1.713 1.197a -1.404 1.236a -1.390
GDPGR -0.024c -0.001 -0.022c 0.007 -0.025c 0.004
GDPPC -0.136c -0.090b -0.178c -0.030 -0.170c -0.014
CA2GDP 0.029c 0.031c 0.030c 0.045c 0.026c 0.047c
DT2GNP 0.006c -0.001 0.006c -0.001 0.006c -0.002
DS2EX 0.378c 0.792c 0.360c 0.966c 0.222 0.872c
SHORTDT -0.001 0.011c -0.002 0.010c -0.001 0.010c
INF 0.016c 0.011 0.011c 0.004 0.012c 0.002
AFRI 0.139 -0.547c 0.356b -0.599c 0.285a -0.648c
LAC 0.127b -0.006 0.217c -0.058 0.202c -0.076
JAN -0.172b -0.158a -0.165a
CONSTANT 6.253c 0.475 6.344c -0.068 6.243c -0.152
No. of bonds 2037 1801 1801
No. of obs. 4954 4398 4398
rho -0.176 -0.342 -0.340
lambda -0.091 -0.183 -0.180
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Table 4B: Model with Exchange Rate Regime and Real Overvaluation (ROV2)
This table presents the regression results based on the Heckman sample selection model
regarding the role of exchange rate regimes and exchange rate overvaluation in a¤ecting
launch spreads. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses for key variables of exchange rate
regimes (ROV2, FIX, INT and their interaction terms). ROV2 is dened as the percentage
change in the REER over the past ve years. We calculate t-statistics using robust standard
errors.
Heckit Model (I) Heckit Model (II) Heckit Model (III)
Spread Issuance Spread Issuance Spread Issuance
ROV2 0.002c 0.002b 0.002c 0.001
(5.627) (1.976) (4.764) (1.119)
ROV2 0.002c 0.002
FIX (4.165) (0.904)
ROV2 0.004c 0.001
INT (4.357) (0.480)
ROV2 -0.000 0.001
FLOAT (-0.300) (0.461)
FIX 0.229c -0.193b 0.261c -0.214b
(4.298) (-2.199) (4.652) (-2.263)
INT 0.187c -0.056 0.167c -0.050
(4.385) (-0.779) (3.781) (-0.688)
AMOUNT 0.024b 0.159c 0.028b 0.162c 0.031b 0.163c
ISSUES -0.002 0.032c -0.003b 0.032c -0.003b 0.031c
RATING -0.101c 0.037c -0.102c 0.016 -0.105c 0.017
USRATE -0.125 -0.573 -0.111 -0.552 -0.085 -0.557
HYD 1.208b -1.683 1.163a -1.439 1.226b -1.443
GDPGR -0.022c 0.008 -0.024c 0.014a -0.022c 0.013a
GDPPC -0.096c -0.030 -0.137c 0.025 -0.157c 0.030
CA2GDP 0.029c 0.033c 0.028c 0.044c 0.025c 0.045c
DT2GNP 0.006c -0.003c 0.006c -0.003c 0.006c -0.003c
DS2EX 0.314c 0.849c 0.290b 0.942c 0.198 0.946c
SHORTDT -0.000 0.009c -0.001 0.008c -0.001 0.008c
INF 0.021c 0.011 0.018c 0.005 0.021c 0.005
AFRI 0.101 -0.553c 0.316b -0.619c 0.270a -0.626c
LAC 0.107b 0.040 0.186c -0.027 0.204c -0.031
JAN -0.168b -0.158a -0.158a
CONSTANT 5.921c 0.248 6.186c -0.187 6.284c -0.218
No. of bonds 2060 1824 1824
No. of obs. 5237 4661 4661
rho -0.240 -0.388 -0.357
lambda -0.125 -0.209 -0.190
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Table 4C: Model with Exchange Rate Regime and Real Overvaluation (ROV3)
This table presents the regression results based on the Heckman sample selection model
regarding the role of exchange rate regimes and exchange rate overvaluation in a¤ecting
launch spreads. t-statistics are shown in parentheses for key variables of exchange rate
regimes (ROV3, FIX, INT and their interaction terms). ROV3 is dened as the deviation
from a predicted level of the real exchange rate, which is obtained based on the equilibrium
concept of Purchasing Power Parity and is adjusted for the Balassa-Samuelsone¤ect. We
calculate t-statistics using robust standard errors.
Heckit Model (I) Heckit Model (II) Heckit Model (III)
Spread Issuance Spread Issuance Spread Issuance
ROV3 0.004 0.025 0.021 0.018
(0.067) (0.350) (0.304) (0.225)
ROV3 0.923c 1.156c
FIX (5.254) (4.003)
ROV3 0.027 -0.191b
INT (0.384) (-2.120)
ROV3 -0.148 0.649c
FLOAT (-1.016) (3.191)
FIX 0.281c -0.053 -0.023 -0.215b
(5.434) (-0.588) (-0.354) (-2.127)
INT 0.168c 0.020 0.134c -0.065
(3.854) (0.314) (3.170) (-0.961)
AMOUNT 0.020c 0.107c 0.027c 0.120c 0.027c 0.092c
ISSUES -0.004c 0.041c -0.005c 0.042c -0.004b 0.045c
RATING -0.111c 0.026c -0.106c 0.019b -0.098c 0.031c
USRATE 0.777c 0.627c 0.683c 0.533c 0.662c 0.540c
HYD 2.637c -0.479 2.706c -0.638a 2.675c -0.653a
GDPGR -0.026c 0.021c -0.030c 0.033c -0.031c 0.028c
CA2GDP 0.024c 0.031c 0.025c 0.037c 0.028c 0.041c
DT2GNP 0.005c -0.004c 0.005c -0.003c 0.005c -0.001
DS2EX 0.235c 0.887c 0.297c 1.001c 0.271c 0.816c
SHORTDT -0.005b 0.005c -0.005b 0.005c -0.004b 0.005c
INF 0.019c 0.012 0.022c -0.008 0.021c -0.009
JAN -0.203c -0.188b -0.184b
CONSTANT 3.715c -2.004c 3.688c -1.967c 3.721c -1.932c
No. of bonds 5272 4661 4661
No. of obs. 2080 1824 1824
rho -0.446 -0.443 -0.368
lambda -0.249 -0.248 -0.201
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Table 5A: Exchange Rate Regime: Endogeneity Correction
This table presents the regression results regarding the role of the exchange rate regime
in a¤ecting launch spreads. Column (I) shows the MLE result based on the Heckman sample
selection model. Column (II) shows the MLE result from using a feasible generalized two-
stage instrumental variable estimator (2SIV) to deal with the potential endogeneity problem
associated with an exchange rate regime. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses for key
variables of exchange rate regimes (FIX, INT, FIXALL). FIXALL is a dummy variable for
countries with de facto pegs throughout our sample period. We also include additional
control variables of DRES, DCRISIS and RES2GNI. We calculate t-statistics using robust
standard errors.
Heckit Model (I) Heckit Model (II)
Spread Issuance Spread Issuance
FIX 0.281c -0.099 0.335c -0.282c
(5.487) (-1.043) (5.721) (-2.736)
INT 0.206c -0.031 0.292c -0.066
(4.847) (-0.422) (4.894) (-0.603)
FIXALL 0.604c -0.386
(2.830) (-1.363)
DRES 0.059 0.110 0.084b 0.202c
DCRISIS -0.022 -0.595b -0.412 -0.935c
RES2GNI -0.016c -0.017c -0.012c -0.014c
AMOUNT 0.021a 0.141c 0.035c 0.137c
ISSUES -0.001 0.032c -0.004c 0.032c
RATING -0.074c 0.055c -0.085c 0.061c
USRATE -0.221 -0.433 -0.268 -0.621
HYD 0.822 -1.424 0.832 -1.996a
GDPGR -0.018c 0.020b -0.021c 0.010
GDPPC -0.036 0.130c -0.039 0.114c
CA2GDP 0.037c 0.049c 0.030c 0.041c
DT2GNP 0.006c -0.001 0.006c -0.001
DS2EX 0.125 0.740c 0.267c 0.586c
SHORTDT 0.000 0.006b -0.002 0.007c
INF 0.008b -0.002 0.016c -0.001
AFRI 0.051 -0.780c 0.033 -0.777c
LAC 0.117b -0.125a 0.049 -0.035
JAN -0.153a -0.179b
CONSTANT 5.857c -0.909 5.836c -0.348
No. of bonds 1822 2078
No. of obs. 4542 5152
rho -0.248 -0.198
lambda -0.130 -0.102
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Table 5B: Exchange Rate Regime and Overvaluation: Endogeneity Correction
This table presents the regression results from using instrumental variables (IV) to
deal with the potential endogeneity problem associated with both exchange rate regime
and real overvaluation. Heckit Models (I-III) are for ROV1-ROV3, respectively. The t-
statistics are shown in parentheses for key variables of exchange rate regime, overvaluation
and their interactions. We also include additional control variables of DRES, DCRISIS, and
RES2GNI. We calculate t-statistics using robust standard errors.
Heckit Model (I) Heckit Model (II) Heckit Model (III)
Spread Issuance Spread Issuance Spread Issuance
ROV 0.037c 0.070c 0.013c 0.008 0.967c 1.234c
FIX (5.967) (6.981) (3.160) (1.525) (3.236) (2.814)
ROV 0.022c 0.029c 0.006 -0.010b -0.109 0.116
INT (4.512) (4.056) (1.417) (-2.236) (-0.918) (0.678)
ROV 0.017c 0.021b 0.007 -0.027c -0.161 0.887c
FLOAT (3.116) (2.491) (1.295) (-4.619) (-0.743) (2.690)
FIX 0.000 -0.723c 0.109 -0.518c 0.103 -0.096
(0.000) (-5.678) (1.401) (-4.409) (1.187) (-0.909)
INT 0.240c -0.093 0.326c -0.005 0.235c 0.027
(3.598) (-0.825) (4.665) (-0.040) (3.483) (0.286)
DRES -0.099a -0.106 -0.014 0.351c 0.088c 0.214c
DCRISIS -0.180 -0.666c -0.276 -1.178c -0.481 -0.584c
RES2GNI -0.008b -0.010b -0.009c -0.018c -0.005 -0.013c
AMOUNT 0.056c 0.169c 0.046c 0.150c 0.038c 0.099c
ISSUES -0.004c 0.025c -0.003c 0.026c -0.005c 0.038c
RATING -0.074c 0.082c -0.078c 0.057c -0.093c 0.064c
USRATE 0.273 0.140 0.057 -0.958 0.699c 0.471b
HYD 1.734c -0.582 1.358b -2.585b 2.536c -0.651a
GDPGR -0.029c -0.001 -0.022c -0.001 -0.025c 0.024c
GDPPC -0.337c -0.277c -0.141b 0.309c
CA2GDP 0.037c 0.056c 0.032c 0.029c 0.029c 0.041c
DT2GNP 0.009c 0.004b 0.008c -0.004b 0.005c 0.001
DS2EX 0.813c 1.324c 0.513c -0.035 0.480c 0.562c
SHORTDT 0.005b 0.014c 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.005b
INF 0.012c -0.002 0.024c -0.006 0.021c 0.003
AFRI 0.191 -0.474c 0.145 -1.060c
LAC 0.145c 0.044 0.103a -0.135
JAN -0.194b -0.193b -0.198b
CONSTANT 6.519c 0.545 5.609c -0.584 3.487c -1.657c
No. of bonds 2078 2078 2078
No. of obs. 5152 5152 5152
rho -0.064 -0.166 -0.206
lambda -0.032 -0.085 -0.107
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Table 5C: Instruments for Exchange Rate Regime and Overvaluation
Column (I) in this table presents the multinomial logit regression results, which are used
to generate the tted values of exchange rate regimes FIX and INT as their instruments.
The dependent variable is the categorical exchange rate class (FIX, INT, or FLOAT). Col-
umn (II) presents the OLS regression results, which are used to generate the tted values
of the three exchange rate overvaluation measures (ROV1, ROV2, ROV3), respectively.
The explanatory variables include allof the exogenous variables used in Tables 5A and 5B,
as well as seven additional variables WORKPOP, OILEX, AREA, ISLAND, REGEXCH,
RESBASE, and SIZE as proposed in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Prasad, Rajan,
and Subrahmanian (2006) and Eichengreen (2008). WORKPOP, obtained from WDI (vari-
able SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS), is the proportion of total population whose ages are between
15 and 64. OILEX is a dummy for oil exporting countries. AREA, obtained from WDI
(variable AG.LNK.TOTL.k2) is land area in sq. km. ISLAND is a dummy for countries
with no mainland territory. RESBASE, obtained from IMF (line 11/line 14), is the initial
ratio of International Reserves to Monetary Base.RESEXCH is the (monthly) aver-
age RR exchange rate regime of the region where the regions are dened as those under
the same IMF department. SIZE, obtained from WDI (variable NY.GDP.MKTP.CD), is a
countrys GDP in dollars over U.S. GDP. For simplicity, only the regression coe¢ cients and
the corresponding t-statistics for the seven additional variables are reported below. The
t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and are calculated using robust standard errors.
Multinomial Logit (I) OLS (II)
FIX INT ROV1 ROV2 ROV3
WORKPOP -1.047c -0.332c 0.101 1.559c -0.017c
(-6.334) (-7.266) (0.986) (9.264) (-14.698)
OILEX 4.663c 0.914c 7.251c 5.897c 0.123c
(5.248) (3.434) (11.070) (5.293) (15.505)
AREA -4.804c 0.429c 0.158 -0.110 -0.009c
(-5.051) (10.082) (1.307) (-0.610) (-7.181)
ISLAND -43.560 -5.453c 5.528c 6.307c -0.182c
(-0.061) (-12.170) (5.587) (3.771) (-14.814)
REGEXCH 11.493c 1.717c -4.261c -0.399 -0.126c
(12.086) (8.110) (-7.485) (-0.419) (-18.916)
RESBASE -7.434c -0.437c -0.168 -2.187c 0.054c
(-11.770) (-5.602) (-0.677) (-5.227) (17.612)
SIZE -153.175c -5.266c -3.602c -10.911c -0.005
(-8.357) (-14.997) (-2.897) (-5.280) (-0.286)
No. of obs. 4816 5190 5419 5458
pseudo R2 0.731 0.421 0.341 0.559
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